Polarised Bashir debate fails to understand foreign policy
by Michael Harris,
2015-07-23 06:02:59.0
SUDANESE President Omar al-Bashir’s recent visit has again highlighted the shortage of clear-eyed analysis of SA’s foreign policy. Both the government and the opposition have handled the matter poorly — the government because it has continuously failed to communicate its strategy, enforce its mediation agreements and follow due process; the opposition because it has missed the opportunity to advance a pragmatic foreign policy agenda.
The rationale for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is beyond question. However, seeing the court as a conflict resolution mechanism is an idealist notion in a realist world. The actions of the government reflect a rigid loyalty to doctrine, but also an appreciation of the court’s limitations. By failing to acknowledge the nature of the government’s dispute with the ICC, the opposition has displayed a lack of nuance that, frankly, is to be expected from a party that has not yet had to govern on the global stage.
To understand the government’s position, we must return to the genesis of the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) mediation doctrine: the party’s own success in achieving a peaceful democratic transition. By empowering FW de Klerk in the negotiations, the ANC gave the National Party (NP) political space and created the conditions for a negotiated settlement. The result was a peaceful transition, the lives of many citizens were saved and the country’s economic and social infrastructure was preserved for the task of reconciliation. It was a significant achievement and a crowning moment for diplomacy.
Had an alternative path been taken, in which the NP was threatened with prosecution and handed "take it or leave it" terms from a Freedom Charter-derived ANC wish list, the result would have been very different. With backs against the wall, the NP would have drawn on all the tools of incumbency to protect its position.
So emerged the ANC’s mediation doctrine of "triangulation". This strategy seeks to empower the perceived aggressor as a full participant in negotiations, in exchange for a cessation in hostilities and acceptance of a road map towards democracy. The doctrine is inherently supportive of human rights because it prioritises diplomacy and seeks above all to protect civilians from violence. The trade-off is that concessions must be made to the perceived aggressor, such as immunity from prosecution or the ability to continue as a political actor.
Emboldened by the success of its strategy and encouraged by the global community to assume a role of African leadership, the ANC sought to apply its doctrine to Africa’s issues. To date, presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have sought to advance a diplomatic agenda based on triangulation in Burundi, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. A glance through that list reveals a chequered record, but one that is not without successes, one of the greatest of which is Sudan. By empowering both parties in negotiations, a settlement was reached that created the new nation of South Sudan and ended a drawn-out civil war.
Triangulation differs from absolutist doctrine, of which recent US intervention in the Middle East is an example. Absolutism typically confers "right" and "wrong" monikers on the parties to a conflict and seeks to assist the "right" actor in prevailing over the "wrong". In the eyes of the ANC, by taking sides, the absolutist approach incentivises incumbents into to-the-death defences of their positions. This fails to protect human rights because it inevitably leads to further conflict and deaths.
An example of the clash of these ideologies came in the Libyan conflict where, far too late in the piece, Zuma attempted to engineer a negotiated settlement. The same was true in Côte d’Ivoire, where South African mediation sought terms to allow Laurent Gbagbo to leave quietly, while the French-led UN forces insisted on arrest and referral to the ICC for prosecution.
By cornering parties to a conflict with the threat of trial at The Hague, the ICC is seen by its detractors as a blunt instrument of absolutism that encourages a last-stand mentality. In reality, both tactics have merit as part of a single mediation strategy: triangulation is a carrot to be employed first, while absolutism is a stick of last resort.
The government can therefore assert that its approach has merit. Where it has fallen down is in implementation. For triangulation to be successful, it must be proactive, seeking to intervene in conflicts before the human toll escalates. Such proactive mediation is stronger if there is an implicit threat of ICC prosecution should a peaceful settlement not be reached.
Agreements must also be legal and their terms honoured by the parties and actively policed. The approach cannot enable incumbency to be wielded with impunity in order to secure a position, such as has happened in Zimbabwe, or fail to curtail violence against civilians, as in Sudan.
Populist rhetoric about manipulation by the forces of imperialism further hurts matters by casting the situation as a zero-sum game. It is this failure to police its agreements and to clearly communicate and achieve buy-in to its strategy that has left the government in its current mess.
If Bashir’s agreement to the resolution terms of the South Sudan conflict was based on guarantees against ICC prosecution, then this needed to be universally recognised, particularly by the court itself. As this did not occur, SA is entitled to disagree, but should have continued to lobby against the contradiction at the heart of the agreement. Failing any shift in ICC policy, the government should have instituted legal processes within SA to withdraw from its treaty obligations, or declined to invite Bashir to the African Union summit.
From the perspective of opposition groups, insisting on respect for the Rome Statute and enforcement of South African law is appropriate. Respect for the rule of law is of paramount importance. However, in framing the issue in narrow legal bounds, the opposition has fallen into the familiar role of watchdog rather than providing strategic leadership. Instead of a nuanced public discourse on the ICC’s role and its relevance to SA’s interests, we have been subjected to vague and idealistic references to a foreign policy based on human rights.
In the Hobbesian struggle that regrettably still defines parts of modern Africa, triangulation is an appropriately pragmatic approach to conflict mediation. Implemented correctly, the doctrine advances human rights and is an important tool in a foreign policy agenda that prioritises SA’s geopolitical interests. In an integrated global economy, foreign relations are critical to South African prosperity. Failing to execute a strategy within the bounds of the rule of law and appealing to idealist principles risks blunting an effective tool for achieving African stability and will only further delegitimise SA’s global leadership.
• Harris is an independent political strategist and a partner at Vsolution Management Consultants
Omar al-Bashir. Picture: REUTERS/SIPHIWE SIBEKO
SUDANESE President Omar al-Bashir’s recent visit has again highlighted the shortage of clear-eyed analysis of SA’s foreign policy. Both the government and the opposition have handled the matter poorly — the government because it has continuously failed to communicate its strategy, enforce its mediation agreements and follow due process; the opposition because it has missed the opportunity to advance a pragmatic foreign policy agenda.
The rationale for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is beyond question. However, seeing the court as a conflict resolution mechanism is an idealist notion in a realist world. The actions of the government reflect a rigid loyalty to doctrine, but also an appreciation of the court’s limitations. By failing to acknowledge the nature of the government’s dispute with the ICC, the opposition has displayed a lack of nuance that, frankly, is to be expected from a party that has not yet had to govern on the global stage.
To understand the government’s position, we must return to the genesis of the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) mediation doctrine: the party’s own success in achieving a peaceful democratic transition. By empowering FW de Klerk in the negotiations, the ANC gave the National Party (NP) political space and created the conditions for a negotiated settlement. The result was a peaceful transition, the lives of many citizens were saved and the country’s economic and social infrastructure was preserved for the task of reconciliation. It was a significant achievement and a crowning moment for diplomacy.
Had an alternative path been taken, in which the NP was threatened with prosecution and handed "take it or leave it" terms from a Freedom Charter-derived ANC wish list, the result would have been very different. With backs against the wall, the NP would have drawn on all the tools of incumbency to protect its position.
So emerged the ANC’s mediation doctrine of "triangulation". This strategy seeks to empower the perceived aggressor as a full participant in negotiations, in exchange for a cessation in hostilities and acceptance of a road map towards democracy. The doctrine is inherently supportive of human rights because it prioritises diplomacy and seeks above all to protect civilians from violence. The trade-off is that concessions must be made to the perceived aggressor, such as immunity from prosecution or the ability to continue as a political actor.
Emboldened by the success of its strategy and encouraged by the global community to assume a role of African leadership, the ANC sought to apply its doctrine to Africa’s issues. To date, presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma have sought to advance a diplomatic agenda based on triangulation in Burundi, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya. A glance through that list reveals a chequered record, but one that is not without successes, one of the greatest of which is Sudan. By empowering both parties in negotiations, a settlement was reached that created the new nation of South Sudan and ended a drawn-out civil war.
Triangulation differs from absolutist doctrine, of which recent US intervention in the Middle East is an example. Absolutism typically confers "right" and "wrong" monikers on the parties to a conflict and seeks to assist the "right" actor in prevailing over the "wrong". In the eyes of the ANC, by taking sides, the absolutist approach incentivises incumbents into to-the-death defences of their positions. This fails to protect human rights because it inevitably leads to further conflict and deaths.
An example of the clash of these ideologies came in the Libyan conflict where, far too late in the piece, Zuma attempted to engineer a negotiated settlement. The same was true in Côte d’Ivoire, where South African mediation sought terms to allow Laurent Gbagbo to leave quietly, while the French-led UN forces insisted on arrest and referral to the ICC for prosecution.
By cornering parties to a conflict with the threat of trial at The Hague, the ICC is seen by its detractors as a blunt instrument of absolutism that encourages a last-stand mentality. In reality, both tactics have merit as part of a single mediation strategy: triangulation is a carrot to be employed first, while absolutism is a stick of last resort.
The government can therefore assert that its approach has merit. Where it has fallen down is in implementation. For triangulation to be successful, it must be proactive, seeking to intervene in conflicts before the human toll escalates. Such proactive mediation is stronger if there is an implicit threat of ICC prosecution should a peaceful settlement not be reached.
Agreements must also be legal and their terms honoured by the parties and actively policed. The approach cannot enable incumbency to be wielded with impunity in order to secure a position, such as has happened in Zimbabwe, or fail to curtail violence against civilians, as in Sudan.
Populist rhetoric about manipulation by the forces of imperialism further hurts matters by casting the situation as a zero-sum game. It is this failure to police its agreements and to clearly communicate and achieve buy-in to its strategy that has left the government in its current mess.
If Bashir’s agreement to the resolution terms of the South Sudan conflict was based on guarantees against ICC prosecution, then this needed to be universally recognised, particularly by the court itself. As this did not occur, SA is entitled to disagree, but should have continued to lobby against the contradiction at the heart of the agreement. Failing any shift in ICC policy, the government should have instituted legal processes within SA to withdraw from its treaty obligations, or declined to invite Bashir to the African Union summit.
From the perspective of opposition groups, insisting on respect for the Rome Statute and enforcement of South African law is appropriate. Respect for the rule of law is of paramount importance. However, in framing the issue in narrow legal bounds, the opposition has fallen into the familiar role of watchdog rather than providing strategic leadership. Instead of a nuanced public discourse on the ICC’s role and its relevance to SA’s interests, we have been subjected to vague and idealistic references to a foreign policy based on human rights.
In the Hobbesian struggle that regrettably still defines parts of modern Africa, triangulation is an appropriately pragmatic approach to conflict mediation. Implemented correctly, the doctrine advances human rights and is an important tool in a foreign policy agenda that prioritises SA’s geopolitical interests. In an integrated global economy, foreign relations are critical to South African prosperity. Failing to execute a strategy within the bounds of the rule of law and appealing to idealist principles risks blunting an effective tool for achieving African stability and will only further delegitimise SA’s global leadership.
• Harris is an independent political strategist and a partner at Vsolution Management Consultants
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