The ANC needed the support of a number of the smaller parties to get the majority vital for Cecil Burgess’s nomination as inspector- general of intelligence. Picture:TREVOR SAMSON
The ANC needed the support of a number of the smaller parties to get the majority vital for Cecil Burgess’s nomination as inspector- general of intelligence. Picture: TREVOR SAMSON

THE African National Congress (ANC) ran into an unlikely problem in the national legislature last week, an issue not comparable to its regular clashes with the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

The ANC had rammed its choice for the position of inspector-general of intelligence — its former MP Cecil Burgess — through the joint standing committee on intelligence (JSCI).

But when it came to a vote in the National Assembly on Thursday evening, its chief whip, Stone Sizani, took everyone by surprise by deferring the matter to a later stage.

The position has been vacant since March when Faith Radebe’s nonrenewable term of office ended, meaning that a replacement was urgently needed.

It is a vital position because it is the civilian oversight mechanism designed to monitor any potential abuses of human rights by the intelligence community.

Indeed, it is considered so important that a special majority of two-thirds of all MPs is required to approve a nomination for appointment by the president.

So what happened last week?

Before the JSCI report nominating Mr Burgess came up for consideration, the House had dealt with the two controversial bills providing billions in extra finance for Eskom. A division was called and the ANC carried the day with 236 votes — a simple majority. In a division all the votes cast are recorded — for, against and abstained.

The ANC holds 249 of the 400 National Assembly seats on offer, or 62.15%.

The Democratic Alliance has 89 seats, or 22.23%, the EFF has 25 seats, or 6.35%, the Inkatha Freedom Party has 10 seats, or 2.4%, and the National Freedom Party has six seats, or 1.57%.

The United Democratic Movement, Freedom Front Plus, Congress of the People, African Christian Democratic Party, African Independent Congress, Agang SA, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and African People’s Convention (APC) all have 1% or less, with four, three, two and one seats each, respectively.

In order to achieve a two-thirds majority a party must have 267 votes. Given that the ANC has 249 seats and on the day that Mr Burgess’s nomination was to be considered, it had only 236 of them in the House. This meant that the ANC would have had to get the co-operation of other parties in order to achieve the special majority.

However, the co-operation of the DA or the EFF was out of the question because the two parties were against the nomination of Mr Burgess — a former ANC MP and the architect of the secrecy bill in Parliament. This meant that the ANC would have had to secure the support of the IFP and a number of the smaller parties to get the necessary majority.

If the ANC had all of its 249 MPs in the House it would have had to gain the support of another 18 MPs, but given that it had 236 MPs in the House on the day, it was 31 votes short of the two-thirds.

Since the ANC had placed the JSCI matter on the order paper the party must have thought that it could achieve the required two-thirds majority. This, of course, raises the question of why the ANC could not even get all its MPs into the House? Could it be that the party struck deals with other parties to achieve the 267 votes?

Or was the ANC simply complacent after years of having a two-thirds majority, or very close to it, for the past 20 years?

The DA was hard at work leading up to the nonvote to ensure that the ANC could not achieve the two-thirds majority.

What is clear is that in the National Assembly the only opposition vote that is guaranteed to the ANC is the single vote of Themba Godi’s APC.

And while the ANC easily achieves a simple majority it is clear that where a special majority is required after 21 years, the honeymoon is over.

Special majorities, sometimes more than two-thirds, are needed to amend the bill of rights, change the Constitution and make certain nominations for appointments — for example, the nomination for public protector needs 60% of all MPs to support it.