IT IS almost two decades since the launch of the arms deal — officially dubbed the Strategic Defence Procurement Programme — and 15 years since the primary contracts were awarded.
But the manoeuvring that went with the arms deal caused huge damage to SA’s political fabric, and the questions around waste and improper dealings remain.
The Seriti commission on the arms deal was never really expected to settle those questions. It was from the start, a clear effort by President Jacob Zuma to make them go away. And while the commission’s report, which was finally published on Thursday, came to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong with the deal, it will not make the cloud go away.
Nor should it. The government’s procurement bill is about R500bn a year, and other public enterprises add a substantial amount to that. The integrity of public procurement processes, whether it be frigates, textbooks, or power stations, nuclear or otherwise, is crucial for the finances of the nation and its moral fibre.
At the moment, there is a battle over whether public sector deals are done in the national interest or to the benefit of select private and political interests.
That battle is not just about whether there is cronyism or corruption in the procurement process, but also about whether money is wasted. In that sense, a probe of the arms deal is as timely as ever, and it would ideally have dug deep to find pointers on whether there were improper dealings and if there was waste.
The terms of reference included whether the arms deal was entirely necessary, given that there were allegations that many of those contracts were placed more to benefit suppliers, go-betweens, and political actors than to enhance SA’s security.
Ideally, one might have looked to the commission for any flaws in the framing of the tenders and the procurement processes that could offer lessons for other megacontracts.
But in the commission’s rather overwhelming 737-page report, there is little of that, nor much evidence of deep digging. The commission refused to admit some crucial documentary evidence or to hear some witnesses, and was less than helpful with documents that some witnesses had requested.
It was very clearly unimpressed, at best, with "argumentative" witnesses, such as Terry Crawford-Browne or Richard Young, or with their allegations of fraud and corruption.
And there was a somewhat paranoid tone to the concluding statement last year by Judge Willie Seriti, who complained about the "barrage of criticism" the commission had endured.
"A massive missed opportunity at arriving at the truth," was one of the more polite responses to it on Thursday from one of the critics.
But, although the commission failed to find evidence of improper conduct, nor any reason to refer the matter to law-enforcement agencies to investigate, its findings on the extent to which the arms that were acquired have actually been used should be carefully looked at by anyone aiming to spend billions of taxpayer rand on megaprojects SA cannot afford.
The frigates were at sea for only 44% of the planned hours between the years 2006 and 2014, the submarines just 40%, and the helicopters were deployed for only about half of the expected hours.
That wasn’t because they were unavailable, says the commission, but because they were not required.
And, of course, it all cost much more than initially budgeted, and brought less financial benefit to SA.
Makes you think. It should make the government think too. Hopefully, it will — otherwise we’re dooming ourselves to another cycle of inappropriate and wasteful spending. We already have enough of that in much smaller projects.
The arms deal included a purchase BAE/SAAB JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft from Sweden. Picture: SUPPLIED
IT IS almost two decades since the launch of the arms deal — officially dubbed the Strategic Defence Procurement Programme — and 15 years since the primary contracts were awarded.
But the manoeuvring that went with the arms deal caused huge damage to SA’s political fabric, and the questions around waste and improper dealings remain.
The Seriti commission on the arms deal was never really expected to settle those questions. It was from the start, a clear effort by President Jacob Zuma to make them go away. And while the commission’s report, which was finally published on Thursday, came to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong with the deal, it will not make the cloud go away.
Nor should it. The government’s procurement bill is about R500bn a year, and other public enterprises add a substantial amount to that. The integrity of public procurement processes, whether it be frigates, textbooks, or power stations, nuclear or otherwise, is crucial for the finances of the nation and its moral fibre.
At the moment, there is a battle over whether public sector deals are done in the national interest or to the benefit of select private and political interests.
That battle is not just about whether there is cronyism or corruption in the procurement process, but also about whether money is wasted. In that sense, a probe of the arms deal is as timely as ever, and it would ideally have dug deep to find pointers on whether there were improper dealings and if there was waste.
The terms of reference included whether the arms deal was entirely necessary, given that there were allegations that many of those contracts were placed more to benefit suppliers, go-betweens, and political actors than to enhance SA’s security.
Ideally, one might have looked to the commission for any flaws in the framing of the tenders and the procurement processes that could offer lessons for other megacontracts.
But in the commission’s rather overwhelming 737-page report, there is little of that, nor much evidence of deep digging. The commission refused to admit some crucial documentary evidence or to hear some witnesses, and was less than helpful with documents that some witnesses had requested.
It was very clearly unimpressed, at best, with "argumentative" witnesses, such as Terry Crawford-Browne or Richard Young, or with their allegations of fraud and corruption.
And there was a somewhat paranoid tone to the concluding statement last year by Judge Willie Seriti, who complained about the "barrage of criticism" the commission had endured.
"A massive missed opportunity at arriving at the truth," was one of the more polite responses to it on Thursday from one of the critics.
But, although the commission failed to find evidence of improper conduct, nor any reason to refer the matter to law-enforcement agencies to investigate, its findings on the extent to which the arms that were acquired have actually been used should be carefully looked at by anyone aiming to spend billions of taxpayer rand on megaprojects SA cannot afford.
The frigates were at sea for only 44% of the planned hours between the years 2006 and 2014, the submarines just 40%, and the helicopters were deployed for only about half of the expected hours.
That wasn’t because they were unavailable, says the commission, but because they were not required.
And, of course, it all cost much more than initially budgeted, and brought less financial benefit to SA.
Makes you think. It should make the government think too. Hopefully, it will — otherwise we’re dooming ourselves to another cycle of inappropriate and wasteful spending. We already have enough of that in much smaller projects.
