A general view of buildings is seen in Lesotho's capital Maseru. Picture: REUTERS
Lesotho's capital Maseru. Picture: REUTERS

LESOTHO has been in the news of late. And it is not good news, I am afraid. In summary, after the general elections of May 26 2012, there was no conclusive winner to form a government alone.

A coalition of "convenience" was cobbled together with the leader of the All Basotho Convention as prime minister (the party holds 30 seats). The party with the largest number of seats (a block) was led by former prime minister Phakalitha Mosisili, but it was unable to form a government on its own (it needed 48 seats).

Ever the smart and cunning fellow, he stepped back and allowed Tom Thabane, who has a non-illustrious political history in Lesotho, to form this coalition government.

But Mosisili really never let go completely and was working behind the scenes to make it impossible for the coalition government to operate. There’s nothing politically wrong with that. It is in the nature of the beast.

Then the coalition government literally failed to "govern".

Ministries became "fiefdoms" of the different political parties and the government was run as a "silo" state.

This was a recipe for a disaster to occur, and it did.

Squabbles and dysfunctional government became the order of the day.

Behind the scenes, Thabane’s "coalition of convenience" was "falling apart and anarchy was loosed" upon Lesotho, to paraphrase poet WB Yeats.

It had become known to Thabane that a new coalition was in the offing and that the Lesotho parliament would soon pass a motion of no confidence in him, ushering the advent of a new government to which he would not be party.

He approached King Letsie to suspend parliament. In the most brazen abuse of the king, Thabane advised him to suspend parliament. Unfortunately, Lesotho’s constitution does not leave the king with much of a choice when the prime minister — "his prime minister" — so advises. Pity. Of course, one has to go back to the 1980s and 1990s to fully understand this situation, in which the king is ceremonial and has no executive power.

The head of the army, who is alleged to have political ties with those opposed to the prime minister, then "staged" what looked like a coup d’état, thus plunging the country into the present crisis.

I am surprised at how the Southern African Development Community (Sadc) leaders have not really seen through what the issues are. They are busy trying to make good out of a deep crisis.

Lesotho is a tiny mountain kingdom. The Basotho lost most of their land during the Basotho-Boer wars between 1856 and 1868.

In fact, most of the eastern Free Sate is really Lesotho. Some even argue that the whole of the Free State up to the Vaal River boundary with Gauteng is historically part of "the lost territory" of Lesotho.

While this might be correct or otherwise, this is now a historical matter unlikely to be reversed. What a pity. New thinking is now required to rearrange the political, social, economic and cultural geography of this "rocky" mountain kingdom.

But before I get to that, why all this instability in Lesotho?

What are people fighting about?

The answer to this question is a very long exposition. There are books and periodicals written about this. But, to our readers, let me state the obvious: In this country, which is poor and with a small economy, control of the government is key to the most primitive forms of wealth accumulation.

Access to a ministry means the ability to loot the state’s resources in order to enrich oneself. It is as crude as all that.

Once someone becomes a minister, their social status changes, their control over tenders and other state resources is enhanced, and "a looter continua!".

So the very thought of losing state power drives even the best men and women to go absolutely berserk.

That is the fundamental basis upon which we should understand the continuing instability in Lesotho.

Is Lesotho different from many other African countries? Maybe not, but the key difference is in the size of the country’s economy, limited resources and very few private-sector opportunities.

It is not like Botswana or Namibia, although it is very much like Swaziland.

Here I offer some thoughts (which have been debated from time to time over many years) on the way forward beyond Sadc’s present "peacemaking" efforts.

First, we should unapologetically reinforce Lesotho’s sovereignty. The calls to make Lesotho a province of SA are reckless and historically badly informed.

Lesotho is an independent state and must remain as such.

I was a student at the National University of Lesotho in the 1980s. We debated this question ad infinitum.

Lesotho has an established international position, is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, the African Union and many other international bodies.

This must never be sacrificed at the altar of sub-imperialist intuitive and short-sighted outbursts or ambitions, or some Pax Pretoriana. Going back to the history of Lesotho is key to understanding this. Dare I add that those of us who found refuge in Lesotho appreciate that if any future struggles might ensue in SA, it is a great hope to have an independent state nearby.

Second, let us start work on establishing a "federal state" arrangement involving SA, Lesotho and Swaziland.

There is no need here, as we are mainly reflecting on Lesotho, to explain why Swaziland should be considered part of this thinking. The federal structural arrangements would mean, among others: abolishing border controls and posts between these countries and SA, although Basotho and MaSwati will still carry their own passports to travel outside the borders of the three countries; free movement of capital and labour, instead of the present ridiculous system in which the government systems are far behind the "clue" given by the people (people cross these borders every day without passports); create a common police border-patrol system for basic anti-crime measures, not people management; create a new revenue/fiscal framework; abolish certain unnecessary ministries and departments in Lesotho and Swaziland and create "federal" ones based in Maseru, Pretoria and Mbabane; abolish the defence forces of Lesotho and Swaziland and create a common Swaziland-SA federal force in addition to the South African National Defence Force because Swaziland shares an external border with Mozambique (Lesotho does not need a defence force); and, finally, create federal "Scorpions-type" anticorruption machinery to stamp out corruption and root out the predatory, corrupt and parasitic political class.

Finally, these processes should succeed if they are supported by the people.

Thus, referendums should be undertaken in all three of these countries to obtain the support of the people.

We must not force through solutions over the heads of the people.

Is all of this possible? Yes, it is.

• Mboweni is a founder member of Mboweni Brothers Investment Holdings and a former Reserve Bank governor.