AFTER a long and arduous election campaign, President Jacob Zuma now has to summon up fresh energy to plan his second term. Before his May 24 inauguration in the Nelson Mandela Amphitheatre at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, he will need to reflect on both the structure and the composition of his Cabinet. He also has to decide which priorities will guide the national executive over the next five years.
Zuma’s first decision will concern his deputy president. All manner of speculation has surrounded this position, with newspaper reports that candidates as unlikely as Baleka Mbete or Naledi Pandor might suddenly be elevated to this role or to a "second deputy president" portfolio.
It remains curious that Pandor has been placed fourth on the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) National Assembly candidate list, despite her limited popularity. This suggests that Zuma does indeed have some higher office in mind for her, but the Ministry of International Relations and Co-operation is more likely to be her destination.
It is unlikely in any event that Zuma will introduce a second deputy president, a step that would require a problematic constitutional change. Such a move would also be viewed as undermining the authority of Cyril Ramaphosa, and it would therefore throw into question the political alliance upon which Zuma’s second term as ANC president was built. The idea that he might undertake this bold manoeuvre is probably just an early manifestation of the succession politics that is likely to grip the ANC over the next three or four years.
The most likely changes in emphasis within the state follow from Zuma’s stated intention to place the National Development Plan (NDP) at the centre of government activity. This will require a further centralisation of power in the Presidency in order to curtail the present autonomy of Cabinet ministers and directors-general.
The National Planning Commission’s secretariat will probably be expanded and integrated with the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and both of these will be tasked with working more closely with the National Treasury to progressively align resource allocation with NDP objectives. This department has since 2009 developed instruments for monitoring the performance of institutions and (more controversially) ministers and officials. But minister Collins Chabane lacks the seniority required to bring recalcitrant ministers into line. Zuma’s likely deputy state president, Cyril Ramaphosa, will presumably become central to performance evaluation across all spheres of government and to the initiation of corrective actions. The NDP could also provide a framework for Presidency-brokered sectoral negotiations to address key policy challenges.
Zuma may also reverse his increase of the size of the Cabinet to 34 members. In 2009, his second-term ambitions were a key factor in his political calculations and Cabinet portfolios were distributed to potential political allies. Now that greater government effectiveness appears to be Zuma’s priority, he is likely to trim unnecessary ministerial retinues and reduce the number of government departments.
The creation of the Department of Economic Development allowed Zuma to fudge key economic policy choices, and to retain the support of industrial and manufacturing workers’ unions. Like the reconstruction and development department under former president Nelson Mandela, it has always seemed to be a temporary stopgap and its key functions could be subsumed under another economics portfolio. A merger between the higher education and science departments — touted as the rationale for the 2009 split in the department of education — could also finally be realised.
We cannot be sure what Zuma will do. He has just led the ANC to a second national and provincial election victory, and he retains the power to veto any possible presidential successor. He is not a lame duck by a long way. If he decides to generate a sense of excitement around his second term by making some surprise appointments, then nobody can say no to the nation’s president.
• Butler teaches politics at the University of Cape Town.
President Jacob Zuma greets supporters of the African National Congress during their final election rally at FNB Stadium in Johannesburg, May 4, 2014. Picture: REUTERS
AFTER a long and arduous election campaign, President Jacob Zuma now has to summon up fresh energy to plan his second term. Before his May 24 inauguration in the Nelson Mandela Amphitheatre at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, he will need to reflect on both the structure and the composition of his Cabinet. He also has to decide which priorities will guide the national executive over the next five years.
Zuma’s first decision will concern his deputy president. All manner of speculation has surrounded this position, with newspaper reports that candidates as unlikely as Baleka Mbete or Naledi Pandor might suddenly be elevated to this role or to a "second deputy president" portfolio.
It remains curious that Pandor has been placed fourth on the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) National Assembly candidate list, despite her limited popularity. This suggests that Zuma does indeed have some higher office in mind for her, but the Ministry of International Relations and Co-operation is more likely to be her destination.
It is unlikely in any event that Zuma will introduce a second deputy president, a step that would require a problematic constitutional change. Such a move would also be viewed as undermining the authority of Cyril Ramaphosa, and it would therefore throw into question the political alliance upon which Zuma’s second term as ANC president was built. The idea that he might undertake this bold manoeuvre is probably just an early manifestation of the succession politics that is likely to grip the ANC over the next three or four years.
The most likely changes in emphasis within the state follow from Zuma’s stated intention to place the National Development Plan (NDP) at the centre of government activity. This will require a further centralisation of power in the Presidency in order to curtail the present autonomy of Cabinet ministers and directors-general.
The National Planning Commission’s secretariat will probably be expanded and integrated with the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and both of these will be tasked with working more closely with the National Treasury to progressively align resource allocation with NDP objectives. This department has since 2009 developed instruments for monitoring the performance of institutions and (more controversially) ministers and officials. But minister Collins Chabane lacks the seniority required to bring recalcitrant ministers into line. Zuma’s likely deputy state president, Cyril Ramaphosa, will presumably become central to performance evaluation across all spheres of government and to the initiation of corrective actions. The NDP could also provide a framework for Presidency-brokered sectoral negotiations to address key policy challenges.
Zuma may also reverse his increase of the size of the Cabinet to 34 members. In 2009, his second-term ambitions were a key factor in his political calculations and Cabinet portfolios were distributed to potential political allies. Now that greater government effectiveness appears to be Zuma’s priority, he is likely to trim unnecessary ministerial retinues and reduce the number of government departments.
The creation of the Department of Economic Development allowed Zuma to fudge key economic policy choices, and to retain the support of industrial and manufacturing workers’ unions. Like the reconstruction and development department under former president Nelson Mandela, it has always seemed to be a temporary stopgap and its key functions could be subsumed under another economics portfolio. A merger between the higher education and science departments — touted as the rationale for the 2009 split in the department of education — could also finally be realised.
We cannot be sure what Zuma will do. He has just led the ANC to a second national and provincial election victory, and he retains the power to veto any possible presidential successor. He is not a lame duck by a long way. If he decides to generate a sense of excitement around his second term by making some surprise appointments, then nobody can say no to the nation’s president.
• Butler teaches politics at the University of Cape Town.
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