ONCE described as weak and defeated, a resurgent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim) has proved its critics wrong by demonstrating that it is still a major threat to governments and civilians in North and West Africa.
Aqim and its affiliates have conducted two major attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso in the past three months, proving political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli right when he said it was better to utterly defeat an opponent lest they come back stronger than before to retaliate.
The Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by an al-Qaeda affiliate in Burkina Faso. This indicates the group is slowly extending its reach beyond its comfort zone of Mali and Niger, where it has been operating for the past three years.
In 2012, Aqim and other jihadist groups participated in the insurgency of northern Mali, with the aim of overthrowing the Malian government. The attempted coup was thwarted when French forces intervened and dispersed the jihadists into the Sahel.
Yet, despite the initial success of the French military operation, sporadic jihadist attacks in Niger and Mali had been on the increase since 2013. Members of Aqim went into hiding as the group’s influence declined, which led to the assumption that it had been defeated following the French intervention.
...
WHILE Aqim went incognito and there were only a few sporadic attacks, another jihadist faction, al-Mourabitoun, became the prominent face of terror in Mali and the surrounding regions.
Al-Mourabitoun is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (right) a veteran of the Afghan jihad. The group’s operations initially consisted of the illegal trafficking of narcotics and kidnappings for ransom. From 2013, however, al-Mourabitoun began conducting attacks against Malian and United Nations peacekeepers and targeting restaurants frequented by foreign nationals.
Within a short time, the group was perceived by the US state department as one of the greatest threats to US interests in the Sahel. Then in November, almost three years after they conducted a joint and failed operation to overthrow the Malian government in a coup, al-Mourabitoun and Aqim besieged the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako. Satisfied with the success of their mission, al-Mourabitoun merged with Aqim on December 5 — a month later, they conducted their first attack.
...
THE Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by al-Qaeda in Burkina Faso. At a time when al-Qaeda Central is being put under pressure by the advance of Islamic State (IS) as the predominant jihadist force, the Burkina Faso incursions demonstrate that al-Qaeda still remains a threat in Africa.
This raises the question why Burkina Faso was targeted. In the aftermath of the French military intervention in northern Mali in 2013, a regional organisation to strengthen co-operation on security in the Sahel was created. This organisation, known as the G5 Sahel, consists of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso.
These countries resolved to tackle the issue of terrorism in the region with the help of the French military. Being part of the G5 Sahel made Burkina Faso a target of militant Islamists, who were waiting for the right moment to strike; the right moment turned out to be January 15. Gunmen attacked a hotel and restaurant in Ouagadougou, resulting in the deaths of 30 people, most of them foreigners.
In retrospect, several lessons can be learned from the Burkina Faso tragedy, of which two are quite crucial. First, a significant development from the attacks in Burkina Faso is the resurgence of Aqim in West Africa.
The merger between Aqim and al-Mourabitoun illustrates the dangers that co-operation between jihadist groups pose to any country or region. Within that alliance, Aqim appears to be responsible for the organisational and propaganda aspects, while al-Mourabitoun is delegated to conduct offensives — as was the case in Bamako and later in Ouagadougou.
With its newly found strength, Aqim now has its sights set on expansion into West Africa.
Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri admonished his IS counterpart last September for instigating dissent among jihadist communities worldwide.
With the fissure between al-Qaeda and IS widening, and reconciliation between them in the near future looking highly unlikely, al-Qaeda definitely wants to maintain its dominance in Africa, with al-Shabaab in the east and a resurgent Aqim in the west.
Second, it is quite evident that military intervention alone as a counterterrorism measure is not sufficient and can lead to the opposite of what was intended.
When the jihadist groups dispersed into the Sahel in 2013 after the French intervention — dubbed Operation Serval — many commentators hailed the mission as a success and concluded that the jihadist group (Aqim and affiliates) were defeated.
After Serval, the French launched a new mission, Operation Barkhane, to build on their prior success in the Sahel region. However, jihadist groups began to regroup during that period.
...
THE French military was faced with the Herculean task of patrolling large swathes of the Sahel. It was only a matter of time before the French and local security forces were incapable of preventing sporadic attacks around Mali. This failure culminated in the Radisson Blu hotel siege in Bamako and later the Ouagadougou incursion. Incidentally, Ouagadougou is host to one of the French regional military bases.
It is becoming vital that military intervention is accompanied by other counterterrorism measures, including countering jihadist ideologies, curbing youth unemployment and tackling the grievances of members of the population whose needs are not being met by their governments.
But this is no easy task. Preventing terrorism is a process; it cannot be achieved overnight. It is a process that requires effort, patience and dedication on the part of governments and civil society.
In addition, the fight against terrorism requires a holistic approach that targets the social, political and economic factors that lead to insurgency.
The failure to realise this will provide the perfect opportunity for groups such as Aqim and its affiliates to reorganise and expand their reach — at the expense of more innocent victims.
• Chelin is as an independent conflict analyst
Vehicles on fire outside Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on January 15 during a siege by gunmen allied to al-Qaeda. Picture: REUTERS
ONCE described as weak and defeated, a resurgent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim) has proved its critics wrong by demonstrating that it is still a major threat to governments and civilians in North and West Africa.
Aqim and its affiliates have conducted two major attacks in Mali and Burkina Faso in the past three months, proving political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli right when he said it was better to utterly defeat an opponent lest they come back stronger than before to retaliate.
The Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by an al-Qaeda affiliate in Burkina Faso. This indicates the group is slowly extending its reach beyond its comfort zone of Mali and Niger, where it has been operating for the past three years.
In 2012, Aqim and other jihadist groups participated in the insurgency of northern Mali, with the aim of overthrowing the Malian government. The attempted coup was thwarted when French forces intervened and dispersed the jihadists into the Sahel.
Yet, despite the initial success of the French military operation, sporadic jihadist attacks in Niger and Mali had been on the increase since 2013. Members of Aqim went into hiding as the group’s influence declined, which led to the assumption that it had been defeated following the French intervention.
...
WHILE Aqim went incognito and there were only a few sporadic attacks, another jihadist faction, al-Mourabitoun, became the prominent face of terror in Mali and the surrounding regions.
Al-Mourabitoun is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (right) a veteran of the Afghan jihad. The group’s operations initially consisted of the illegal trafficking of narcotics and kidnappings for ransom. From 2013, however, al-Mourabitoun began conducting attacks against Malian and United Nations peacekeepers and targeting restaurants frequented by foreign nationals.
Within a short time, the group was perceived by the US state department as one of the greatest threats to US interests in the Sahel. Then in November, almost three years after they conducted a joint and failed operation to overthrow the Malian government in a coup, al-Mourabitoun and Aqim besieged the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako. Satisfied with the success of their mission, al-Mourabitoun merged with Aqim on December 5 — a month later, they conducted their first attack.
...
THE Ouagadougou attack was the first major operation by al-Qaeda in Burkina Faso. At a time when al-Qaeda Central is being put under pressure by the advance of Islamic State (IS) as the predominant jihadist force, the Burkina Faso incursions demonstrate that al-Qaeda still remains a threat in Africa.
This raises the question why Burkina Faso was targeted. In the aftermath of the French military intervention in northern Mali in 2013, a regional organisation to strengthen co-operation on security in the Sahel was created. This organisation, known as the G5 Sahel, consists of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso.
These countries resolved to tackle the issue of terrorism in the region with the help of the French military. Being part of the G5 Sahel made Burkina Faso a target of militant Islamists, who were waiting for the right moment to strike; the right moment turned out to be January 15. Gunmen attacked a hotel and restaurant in Ouagadougou, resulting in the deaths of 30 people, most of them foreigners.
In retrospect, several lessons can be learned from the Burkina Faso tragedy, of which two are quite crucial. First, a significant development from the attacks in Burkina Faso is the resurgence of Aqim in West Africa.
The merger between Aqim and al-Mourabitoun illustrates the dangers that co-operation between jihadist groups pose to any country or region. Within that alliance, Aqim appears to be responsible for the organisational and propaganda aspects, while al-Mourabitoun is delegated to conduct offensives — as was the case in Bamako and later in Ouagadougou.
With its newly found strength, Aqim now has its sights set on expansion into West Africa.
Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri admonished his IS counterpart last September for instigating dissent among jihadist communities worldwide.
With the fissure between al-Qaeda and IS widening, and reconciliation between them in the near future looking highly unlikely, al-Qaeda definitely wants to maintain its dominance in Africa, with al-Shabaab in the east and a resurgent Aqim in the west.
Second, it is quite evident that military intervention alone as a counterterrorism measure is not sufficient and can lead to the opposite of what was intended.
When the jihadist groups dispersed into the Sahel in 2013 after the French intervention — dubbed Operation Serval — many commentators hailed the mission as a success and concluded that the jihadist group (Aqim and affiliates) were defeated.
After Serval, the French launched a new mission, Operation Barkhane, to build on their prior success in the Sahel region. However, jihadist groups began to regroup during that period.
...
THE French military was faced with the Herculean task of patrolling large swathes of the Sahel. It was only a matter of time before the French and local security forces were incapable of preventing sporadic attacks around Mali. This failure culminated in the Radisson Blu hotel siege in Bamako and later the Ouagadougou incursion. Incidentally, Ouagadougou is host to one of the French regional military bases.
It is becoming vital that military intervention is accompanied by other counterterrorism measures, including countering jihadist ideologies, curbing youth unemployment and tackling the grievances of members of the population whose needs are not being met by their governments.
But this is no easy task. Preventing terrorism is a process; it cannot be achieved overnight. It is a process that requires effort, patience and dedication on the part of governments and civil society.
In addition, the fight against terrorism requires a holistic approach that targets the social, political and economic factors that lead to insurgency.
The failure to realise this will provide the perfect opportunity for groups such as Aqim and its affiliates to reorganise and expand their reach — at the expense of more innocent victims.
• Chelin is as an independent conflict analyst
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