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Picture: THINKSTOCK

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WILLIAM Baepi calls himself a "street patroller". He lives in Meadowlands, Soweto, and recently had the opportunity of engaging in a lively way with African National Congress (ANC) secretary-general Gwede Mantashe, when the latter did some door-to-door canvassing in Soweto. The exchange covered a variety of topics, one of which touched on corruption.

Baepi apparently asked Mantashe whether the ANC has a strategy for dealing with corruption. The press coverage of their discussion goes no further than an acknowledgement by Mantashe that there is a problem with corruption in South Africa.

The ANC’s electioneering is built around the theme that it has a "good story to tell". While it is true that, in respect of many aspects of service delivery, there is indeed a good story to tell, the truth in respect of corruption is that there is no good story to tell, just a tall story.

Under the Thabo Mbeki administration, the need to combat corruption effectively was recognised. Between them, then justice minister Penuell Maduna and then national director of public prosecutions Bulelani Ngcuka came up with the idea of the Scorpions, a unit within the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) that was able to tackle corruption with zeal and independence. The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), to give the Scorpions their official title, was legislated, created, resourced and trained in the so-called troika methodology of corruption busting. This involved close co-operation among prosecutors, investigators and forensic experts.

The Scorpions did very well. Indeed, after training from experts in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and at Scotland Yard, they were able to mount investigations in a way that can accurately be described as acting without fear, favour or prejudice. It was the Scorpions that brought former police chief and Interpol head Jackie Selebi to book. A strategy that works well enough to unseat a chief of police is a good one.

However, at its sea-change Polokwane conference in 2007, the ANC resolved that the Scorpions be dissolved urgently and replaced with a unit in the South African Police Service. Mantashe candidly conceded to Democratic Alliance (DA) leader Helen Zille that too many ANC politicians were receiving the unwanted attention of the Scorpions and that it was for this reason that they were to be disbanded. The recent Travelgate scandal and the unusual and less than legal fundraising efforts of the ANC were too much for the conference to bear or abandon; dissolving the Scorpions was seen as the way to prevent such embarrassments in future.

At the time, the DA drew attention to the ANC’s need to protect prominent members of the governing alliance. "Besides the seven convicted criminals on the ANC’s national executive committee, six (national executive committee) members are currently the subjects of ongoing criminal investigations. At least two of these are under investigation by the (Scorpions)," the DA grumbled.

All too soon, the Scorpions, despite valiant litigation to save them, were history and were replaced by the Hawks, or Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation, a police unit. Their work rate fell dramatically when compared with that of their predecessors. According to the annual reporting of the NPA, the number of new investigations fell by 85%, while the value of contraband under attachment fell a staggering 99.1%, from more than R4bn to just R35m.

Further litigation around the lack of an ANC strategy to deal with corruption led to a finding that the enabling legislation for the Hawks was unconstitutional in that it failed to create a sufficiently independent body to be an effective anticorruption entity. Parliament was given 18 months to remedy this. It took the full 18 months to do so, coming up with a new system that has rightly been described as a "tweaking" of the Hawks legislation.

Both the original litigant, the indefatigable Bob (Hugh) Glenister, and the Helen Suzman Foundation impugned the new legislation in proceedings in the Western Cape High Court last year. That court struck down some provisions of the new act, but not all of those attacked in the two cases brought and heard together.

There will be a further hearing of the matters in the Constitutional Court next month, shortly after the elections, in which these parties will contend afresh that the scheme of the new act is lacking, while the state will stoutly defend the reincarnation of the Hawks.

If it is so that the Scorpions were closed down for the reason admitted by Mantashe, then there is and remains no strategy, and indeed no political will, for the ANC to combat corruption effectively. There is only lip service to the idea.

An independent and effective anticorruption entity has to be imbued with certain characteristics that enable and empower it. There must be specialisation in the sense that a dedicated body is required. Fighting the corrupt is not a part-time pursuit. Properly trained personnel are needed and they need to be generously resourced in a manner that is guaranteed by law so that governors are not in a position to confiscate the energy and finances that drive the anticorruption unit. Most important, the anticorruption unit must enjoy security of tenure of office. This is where the Scorpions were vulnerable. A mere majority of 50% in Parliament was able to seal their fate. Had they been a chapter 9 institution, this would not have been the case.

It follows that any strategy to combat corruption must have a specialised, well-trained, properly resourced anticorruption unit that enjoys security of tenure of office. The ANC lacks the political will to do this, hence the mere tweaking of the Hawks and the adverse finding in the Western Cape High Court; one that is likely to be upheld, or even expanded, in the coming hearing.

The answers Mantashe gave when he canvassed door to door in Soweto are not satisfactory. Nor can they ever be while the ANC pays lip service to its notion of anticorruption strategies. While the political will to create an adequately independent anticorruption entity is lacking, the ANC will continue to have no viable strategy to combat corruption. It will continue to flounder, to the chagrin of the voting public, and will continue to lose support at the polls. Whether the support is lost to a sufficient extent to bring the ANC back to its senses in relation to fighting corruption, is an open question. It is possible the ANC has become so enmeshed in protecting the corrupt, which was the initial intention behind the dissolution of the Scorpions, that it is incapable of developing the necessary strategy to deal adequately with it.

It is instructive that a person who describes himself as a street patroller in Soweto is able to put his finger on the essential weakness of the ANC with a single question. The ANC has a tall story to tell on its commitment to fighting corruption. It lacks the political will to form an adequately independent anticorruption entity and will continue to do so while so many of its leaders are involved in the type of activity that would attract the unwanted attention of a truly independent anticorruption unit. The fiasco around Nkandla is but an isolated example.

It is not only the task of the courts to generate the necessary environment to put the right legislative framework in place. It is also the duty of every voter to decide whether it is wise to support a party that has such a tall story to tell on its commitment to fighting corruption, and no political will to do so.

• Hoffman is a director of the Institute for Accountability in Southern Africa.